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Abstract
Background: Homeopathy is a major modality in complementary and alternative medicine. Significant tensions
exist between homeopathic practice and education, evident in the diversity of practice styles and pedagogic
models. Utilizing clinical reasoning knowledge in conventional medicine and allied health sciences, this article
seeks to identify and critique existing research in this important area.
Materials and methods: A literature search utilizing MEDLINE, Allied and Complementary Medicine (AMED),
and CINAHL (Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature) was conducted. Key terms including
clinical thinking, clinical reasoning, decision-making, homeopathy, and complementary medicine were utilized.
A critical appraisal of the evidence was undertaken.
Results: Four (4) studies have examined homeopathic clinical reasoning. Two (2) studies sought to measure and
quantify homeopathic reasoning. One (1) study proposed a reasoning model, based on pattern recognition,
hypothetico-deductive reasoning, intuition, and remedy-matching (PHIR-M), resembling much that has been
previously mapped in conventional medical reasoning research. The fourth closely investigated the meaning and
use of intuition in homeopathic decision-making.
Conclusions: Taken together, these four studies provide valuable insight into what is currently known about
homeopathic clinical reasoning. However, despite the history and breadth of practice, little is known about
homeopathic clinical reasoning and decision-making. Building on the research would require viewing clinical
reasoning not only as a cognitive phenomenon but also as a situated and interactive one. Further research into
homeopathic clinical reasoning is indicated.
Introduction
Homeopathy is at a critical juncture. It is polarizedbetween the positivistic domain of randomized con-
trolled trials and traditional clinical methods, and the idealism
and artistry of 21st-century practices, largely influenced by
developments in psychology,1 psychotherapy,2 and related
humanistic sciences. Underpinning this polarization exists a
dialogue3,4 that concerns the theoretical foundations of tra-
ditional Hahnemannian homeopathy, and the contemporary
practices of homeopaths in the real world. The once exclusive
technical–rationalist approach developed by the founder
Hahnemann and enhanced by Bo¨nninghausen has been rad-
ically challenged by the artistic–therapeutic approach that
emerged with George Vithoulkas in the late 1970s5,6 and has
been strengthened by Jan Scholten,7,8 Rajan Sankaran,9–11 and
other contemporary homeopathic theorists. In this context,
the question arises as to what theoretical foundations indi-
vidual practitioners base their homeopathic decision-making
on. The focus of this article is to critically appraise the research
evidence that informs understanding of homeopathic clinical
reasoning, and how it should be taught and learned.
Clinical Reasoning
Clinical reasoning has been defined as the thinking and
decision-making processes associated with clinical practice.12
Our findings in the homeopathic literature will be viewed
against this definition. Key elements of clinical reasoning
include knowledge, cognition, and metacognition and are
context-, practitioner-, and patient-dependent. During the
past 30 years, the medical and allied health professions have
explored and developed diverse clinical reasoning theories
and models of practice. Research into clinical reasoning that
draws from cognitive psychology, in medicine in particular,
views clinical reasoning as a two-system model of analytical
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and nonanalytical thinking used interchangeably based on
situational demands.13,14 Common models of analytical rea-
soning include hypothetico-deductive reasoning, while pat-
tern recognition and the use of heuristics are models of
nonanalytical reasoning. More recent research using an in-
terpretive approach suggests that culture, language, and
communication are significant elements of clinical reason-
ing.15–17 This article seeks to review homeopathic clinical
reasoning research against existing clinical reasoning litera-
ture in health care.
Critical Discourse: The Imperative
Despite more than 200 years of continuous practice and
close to 300 randomized controlled trials of varying quali-
ty,18 little is known about the decision-making experiences of
homeopaths in clinical practice. Research effort has focused
on proving the validity of the homeopathic method itself.
Although this is important, randomized trials of specific
treatments and medicines have tended to dilute available
resources, time, and energy for other forms of legitimate
research questions. Assumptions that homeopathy is unsci-
entific and unproven underpin continued research efforts to
validate homeopathic practice.19,20 Homeopathy continues to
grow in popularity among physicians21,22 and patients,23
despite vociferous conventional opposition.24–26 This popu-
list growth is not surprising given the breadth of clinical
styles and methods in vogue in homeopathy27 coupled with
recent theoretical and clinical developments. These include
interesting developments in the reconstruction and reorga-
nization of homeopathic repertory,28 the potential clinical
application of many unproven medicinal plants11 and min-
eral medicines7,8 along with portraits of many lesser-known
yet positively influential homeopathic figures themselves.29
These developments have fostered the seeds of critical
discourse between diverse schools of homeopathic thought,
yet to a great extent the debate lacks transparency, when
looking at the scope of practice and experiences of individual
homeopaths. Although some profess adherence to orthodox,
Hahnemannian protocols,30 others are eager to extend the
boundaries beyond orthodox provings and prescribing
techniques.9–11, 31–33 Although debate has occasionally been
public, 3,4 this has been of no significant benefit for homeo-
paths or homeopathy. In Australia, intraprofessional debate
has been relatively absent in homeopathic discourse, con-
fined to college corridors and staffrooms—a silence that
underestimates the differences between critical and practical
standpoints, particularly in homeopathic education. We
looked to the homeopathic literature on decision-making and
clinical reasoning in order to shed light on this discourse.
Existing Research
A literature review was conducted using MEDLINE,
Allied and Complementary Medicine (AMED), Com-
plementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM via PubMed)
and Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health
Literature (CINAHL) databases. Keywords including
homeopathy, clinical reasoning, decision-making, clinical
thinking, professional practice, and education were uti-
lized. After combining the keywords ‘‘decision-making,’’
‘‘clinical reasoning,’’ and ‘‘homeopathy,’’ 10 results emerged,
of which 6 were relevant to the real subject of interest. After
reviewing the abstracts, four articles were found to be
specifically relevant.
To date, only these four studies34–37 have considered how
homeopaths reason and make decisions. Of these studies,
two—Van Haselen and Liagre (1992)34 and Brien et al.
(2004)35—were quantitative, specifically focused on devel-
oping the means to measure how homeopaths make clinical
decisions. In contrast, Burch et al. (2008)36 and Brien et al.
(2009)37 have sought to understand how homeopaths make
decisions, utilizing a qualitative phenomenological ap-
proach. We provide a brief description and critique of each of
these key studies, and discuss the implications for homeo-
pathic education.
Decision-tree reasoning
Van Haselen and Liagre’s pilot study examined the effi-
cacy of homeopathic treatment as a whole in addition to the
efficacy of individualized decision strategies in the diagnosis
of acute and chronic otitis media.34 The authors acknowledge
(p. 13) that their study is based on decision strategies within
a restricted clinical domain and that a trade-off exists be-
tween scientific rigor and the reality of practice. This trade-
off represents a simplification of real practice and although
acknowledged, remains problematic.
The homeopaths were provided with a questionnaire lead-
ing to ‘‘predefined’’ homeopathic symptom profiles. This was
essentially an algorithmic exercise based on multivariate sta-
tistical analysis techniques. The research approach, dependent
on cognitive reasoning theory38,39 and cognitive ability, as-
sumed that clinicians behave according to fixed, clearly iden-
tifiable, specific reasoning pathways. This linear, mechanistic
model reflected much of the work that has been discussed in
procedural reasoning studies in fields including medicine14
and occupational therapy.40 If the patient did not ‘‘fit’’ one of
the predefined homeopathic profiles, the homeopath was
permitted to prescribe another medicine. The methods and
reasoning strategies for these other, undefined profiles were
not stated or discussed, which leads us to question the meth-
odological rigor and validity of the study. Moreover, the au-
thors had hoped their findings would represent the ‘‘realism’’
of practice but acknowledged they were no closer to achieving
this goal. They had not elucidated whether ‘‘reality’’ in their
worldview concerned the homeopath, the patient or some
other reality within the health services domain.
The clinical data presented in the given case were narrow.
Limited questions were asked by the researchers, reducing
the decision pathways available and thus minimizing the
range of possible homeopathic diagnoses. As a result, their
study did not take into account the complexity and diversity
of homeopaths’ reasoning processes. Van Haselen and Lia-
gre34 do, however, suggest that ‘‘symptoms’’ need to be more
closely defined before being investigated. For example, if a
child is described as ‘‘irritable when sick,’’ they ask ‘‘what
features and expressions can be taken as indicators of the
depth or extent of the child’s irritability?’’ The issue of rubric
(symptom) interpretation is one that is commonly encoun-
tered in practice and education and warrants closer investi-
gation from the clinicians’ and students’ perspectives.
Questions of this kind need to be investigated with practic-
ing homeopaths. They are most likely contextual issues but
are seldom well-qualified.
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In Van Haselen and Liagre’s study, practitioners were
constrained from being open to interpretive chance, intui-
tion, expertise, or other diverse reasoning skills or experi-
ences. In a sense, this ignores and denies the possibility of
noninductive reasoning abilities, of tacit knowledge, per-
sonal experience, and insight born of professional experience
and expertise. Clinical reasoning links and integrates all ele-
ments of practice, demands diverse capabilities,41 and is
generally a nonlinear practice. It is not merely a process of
fixed, predefined pathways leading to an outcome. An al-
gorithmic practice model that is linear, mechanistic, and
lacks realism will have limited scope in the education of
homeopaths who are required to deal with the complex re-
ality of homeopathic practice.
Cognitive and intuitive decision-making
Brien et al. (2004)35 examined the validity and consistency
of decision-making processes of homeopaths. The partici-
pants, 3 homeopaths, were required to analyze a re-proving
of Belladonna 30c versus placebo using a questionnaire in
order to determine whether the provers exhibited a genuine
proving response. Analyzing the proving diaries of 206
provers, the participants reported whether they thought the
proving subjects exhibited a proving response, no proving
response, or whether they were undecided. Supplied with
the provers’ diaries, participants were required to rate their
use of clinical facts and intuition as decision determinants.
The findings demonstrated inconsistency and variability
among homeopaths’ reasoning. The level of agreement be-
tween the raters was only moderate, even against limited
data. The authors found that participants used significantly
higher intuition scores when classifying a proving response
than when classifying those who had no proving response, in
which there was greater reliance on clinical ‘‘facts.’’ This may
be explained by findings from medicine where experienced
doctors were found to revert to deductive models of rea-
soning when faced with complex and uncertain cases.14
While it is recognized42–44 to be an integral component of
health professional decision-making, a coherent explanation
and definition of intuition is missing from this study. Brien
et al. acknowledged that their method was unable to accu-
rately measure homeopaths’ decision-making.
The participants in this study were experienced, re-
sourceful homeopaths, yet faced with the same data there
was a statistically low correlation as to whether or not the
trial subjects had proved Belladonna 30c or whether they had
taken placebo. Authors, including some in the homeopathic
field,45 recognize that clinical reasoning processes are highly
individualized and based on idiosyncratic knowledge as well
as an empathic and therapeutic context between patient and
clinician. These aspects of the therapeutic relationship, in-
cluding patient enablement and relational empathy, have
had some investigation46–49 but not from the perspective of
their impact on clinical reasoning processes. Homeopaths
utilize a multitude of data through observation, physical
examination, and complex practitioner–patient interaction,
much of which could not possibly be conveyed in these
cases. This brings into question the validity of the study.
Brien et al.35 found that based on the limited data they
were presented with, their participants exhibited only a
moderate level of agreement when defining proving symp-
toms and even less agreement when clinically prescribing for
a given case. Their discussion reflects similar findings in the
literature that it was difficult to validate inter-rater decision
reliability.50–52 Whether the researchers employed article
cases, questionnaires, or proving diaries, there was generally
a low level of consensus among the participating homeo-
paths. These studies35,50–52 uniformly concluded that further
quantitative and qualitative research to illuminate how ho-
meopaths reason and make decisions was required.
Pattern recognition, hypothetico-deductive reasoning,
intuition, and remedy-matching (the PHIR-M model)
The later study by Burch et al.36 used a qualitative ap-
proach in the form of interpretive phenomenological analy-
sis, designed to understand how homeopaths actually make
decisions rather than focusing on measurable, generalizable
outcomes that had proved to be difficult. This methodolog-
ical transition represents a considerable shift in focus from
Brien et al. (2004).35
The study by Burch et al.36 is the first detailed and rigor-
ous qualitative study of homeopathic reasoning. The aim of
their study was to explore how homeopaths made pre-
scribing decisions during their first consultation with new
patients. Their method comprised in-depth, semistructured,
face-to-face interviews with 14 homeopaths in private prac-
tice. After these were conducted, interpretive phenomeno-
logical analysis was carried out on the data by 3 independent
researchers.
The authors found that homeopaths in their study used
predominantly cognitive processes in achieving prescribing
decisions, including pattern recognition and hypothetico-
deductive reasoning, leading to a precise remedy match.
Four (4) themes emerged from the data: three related to the
process of identifying a remedy and one to the factors that
might influence this process. Two (2) further themes emerged:
the awareness of practitioner bias in decision-making and the
role of the patient–practitioner relationship as it influences
decision-making. These themes have not been further ex-
plored, but the authors conclude that they fitted into the
PHIR-M decision-making model. They contend that their
model adds weight to the growing argument that intuition is
a valuable component of professional decision-making.
The PHIR-M model includes existing, well-mapped clini-
cal reasoning characteristics including pattern recognition,
hypothetico-deductive reasoning, and intuition. These rea-
soning characteristics are already well developed and rec-
ognized in other health professional disciplines such as
general medicine,14 nursing,53–55 physiotherapy56,57 and oc-
cupational therapy.58–59 The authors suggest that remedy
matching is an outcome of the clinical reasoning process,
predominantly employed by more experienced homeopaths,
a type of top-down process (understanding of the whole
situation at once) that blends both cognitive reasoning and
intuitive qualities. This contrasts with the bottom-up ap-
proach (process of working from the data), which is more
characteristic of hypothetico-deductive reasoning employed
typically by less experienced homeopaths. The PHIR-M
model is probably well suited to experienced homeo-
paths, but may be less appropriate for students and novices.
Students and novices tend to store knowledge in a more
disorganized and disjointed pattern and to retrieve it in a
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trial-and-error fashion.60 They lack sufficient knowledge of
homeopathic materia medica (comprising over 3000 medi-
cines) to make accurate pattern recognition decisions, and
are heavily reliant on deductive reasoning, maximizing the
resources required of both the patient and the homeopath.
The authors conclude that intuition is a valuable compo-
nent of decision-making for homeopaths. They suggest two
types of intuition: a cognitive type based on beliefs, experi-
ence, and clinical knowledge, and a precognitive type, which
refers to gaining information about the future without in-
ference to the past or present. They further propose that their
research participants used the former (cognitive) character-
istics of intuition, without asking the participants what they
understood by the term itself. Some of the participants ad-
mitted to utilizing intuition more or less as a form of artistic,
individual interpretation. Whether intuition can be distin-
guished from conventional clinical or professional judgment
requires further exploration.
The model is complex, dynamic, and integrative in nature
and demonstrates that homeopathic clinical reasoning en-
compasses elements of traditional clinical reasoning identi-
fied in medicine, nursing, and the allied health professions. A
limitation of this research is the narrow focus on remedy
matching in the first visit, when homeopaths clearly make
decisions about patient care beyond remedy matching and
based often on a longitudinal and holistic understanding of
the patient. The focus on the cognitive aspects of reasoning is
also a limitation because it ignores the situated and interac-
tive nature of reasoning61 along with the importance of
language.15 Being a predominantly narrative method of
practice, substantial meaning is contained in practitioner–
patient dialogue. The focus simply on cognition ignores the
practitioner–patient interaction during clinical practice, and
its essential influence on decision-making practices.
The use and meaning of intuition
Brien et al. (2009)37 investigated intuition in homeopathic
clinical decision-making and recognized that the Brien et al.
(2004)35 study had not explored what homeopaths themselves
understood by intuition in practice. They interviewed 14
non-NHS homeopaths in southern England in 2006. The
participants were asked to explore the role and meaning of
intuition through open-ended reflective questioning on their
practices. The homeopaths found it difficult to articulate and
explicitly define their conceptions of intuition. Nevertheless,
four themes emerged inductively from the data ranging from
the recognition and description of intuition, beliefs about the
origins of intuition, types of intuition, and the selective use of
intuition.
The authors argued that, as with conventional medicine
and allied health professions, homeopaths utilize intuition
and are selective as to whether their intuition should be
trusted, in particular concerning homeopathic remedy se-
lection and treatment. They were more inclined to trust
their intuition within the therapeutic relationship with pa-
tients, than when making treatment decisions where a for-
mal analytical process was used to ‘‘check’’ their intuition.
The issue of impression management by the participants in
answering questions about the use of intuition in treatment
decisions in this research is acknowledged as a limitation by
the authors.
Discussion
Taken together, these four articles provide valuable in-
sight into what is currently known about homeopathic clin-
ical reasoning. The focus on measuring homeopathic clinical
reasoning has been problematic and has resulted in some
researchers shifting focus toward qualitative research meth-
ods in order to understand how homeopaths make decisions.
The PHIR-M model36 and the additional insights into intui-
tion37 are significant in mapping the characteristics of ho-
meopathic reasoning against the existing clinical reasoning
literature from other health professional fields. Homeopathic
clinical reasoning processes may to some extent reflect the
practices of other health professionals. In our view, homeo-
pathic clinical reasoning embodies certain key models of
existing clinical reasoning theory, namely, pattern recogni-
tion, hypothetico-deductive reasoning, and some metacog-
nitive elements such as reflection and intuition. Over and
above these, it is possible that the ‘‘whole person’’ or ‘‘ho-
listic’’ approach that drives homeopathic practice is a central
and distinguishing clinical reasoning feature, yet the gaps in
research as well as the particularities of homeopathy suggest
that much more research needs to be undertaken as a means
of building our understanding of professional practice.
Clearly, there is much further work to be done in confirming,
Table 1. Questions on Clinical Reasoning for Homeopaths, Educators, and Researchers
Clinical reasoning questions for:
Professional homeopaths Homeopathic educators/researchers
What theories or models inform my clinical reasoning?
Am I (critically) reflective about my reasoning practices?61
Does my reasoning approach suit my practice
and my practice philosophy?
Do I reason cognitively, intuitively, and interactively?
Do I use other skills and processes?
Does my reasoning (capacity) represent what is already
known in the clinical reasoning literature?14
How can I develop a therapeutic relationship that
supports shared decision-making?
What key clinical reasoning and decision-making
factors inform how I teach homeopathic history
taking and case analysis?
Can I adapt clinical reasoning theory to reflect
practice in the real world?64
How can existing clinical reasoning research inform
homeopathic education?
What is the relationship between knowledge and action
in homeopathic teaching and have I reflected on it?65
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modifying, or refuting these models or in developing more
explanatory models of real practice.
Further investigation into the nature of homeopathic
practice can inform education and practice. Although the
existing homeopathic literature has begun to investigate
theories and processes as they affect clinical practice, it has
not explored the impact of homeopaths’ values, beliefs, and
interests on their reasoning and decision-making behaviors,
nor has it considered the extent to which these influences are
consciously understood or acknowledged. Clinical reasoning
is a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon; there-
fore, it is influenced by context.17,62 Building on the existing
research would require viewing clinical reasoning not only
as a cognitive phenomenon but also as a cognitive and in-
teractive phenomenon. This would generate new knowledge
regarding the complex, holistic practice approach adopted
by homeopaths which, based on the findings of this review,
is currently under-researched.
Implications
The literature is beginning to generate important research
questions about clinical reasoning that need to be asked of
practicing homeopaths, of the homeopathic profession, and
of professional educators. These questions will inform in-
traprofessional debate and stimulate homeopathic discourse,
and help resolve (explore) the differences between critical
and practical standpoints. Such debate and discourse can
provide a basis for homeopathic educators to critically reflect
on their practice, and help develop the research agenda. For
example, by reflecting on their own clinical reasoning and
decision-making factors, educators can include evidence-
based ways to encourage novice homeopathic history taking
and case analysis.
Having explored clinical reasoning in their respective
domains for nearly 3 decades, medicine and the major
allied health professions including nursing, physiotherapy,
and occupational therapy have slowly incorporated clinical
reasoning theories and frameworks into their educational
curricula. Homeopathic education is yet to recognize this
need and to make this transition. This is due to the paucity of
research highlighted in this article as well as the lack of
critical dialogue necessary to transform the educational
agenda.
The questions that might be asked of professional ho-
meopaths, homeopathic educators, and researchers are
summarized in Table 1. The questions for homeopaths are
most likely beyond the scope of most novice practitioners.
Such questions demonstrate the need to explore how ho-
meopaths reason, what forms of knowledge, attitudes, and
beliefs underpin their reasoning experiences, and endeavor
to integrate theory, practice, and education. Applying re-
flective questions to the cognitive processes and factors
influencing decision-making promotes self-awareness (or
metacognitive awareness).63 This serves two functions: (1) By
bringing a capability that is often subconscious to awareness,
clinicians are able to critique their decision-making more
readily; and (2) It improves the clarity of communicating
reasoning whether when caring for clients, teaching stu-
dents, or communicating with colleagues.16 It is then more
likely that clinicians can contribute to debate about the
profession in a self-aware and informed way (Table 1).64,65
The reasons for the lack of current research investigating
homeopathic reasoning are complex and multidimensional.
They range from insufficient industry funding to a lack of
professional vision in addition to sustained opposition from
within and without.66,67 As homeopathic education (in
Australia) progresses into the higher-education sector, the
educational agenda must be aligned to both theoretical and
practical developments. Rigorous research that reflects and
represents actual professional practice is imperative, as it will
contribute to the growth and development of a sustainable
educational model.
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